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SECESSION, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,
AND CLEAR OBJECTIVES: WHEN TO COMMIT
UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES
I. INTRODUCTION
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and
governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will hence-
forth ignore at their peril.
- President Woodrow Wilson'
Though proclaimed more than seventy-five years ago, President
Wilson's statement still rings true today. Across the globe, ethnic peo-
ples are demanding the right to secede by sounding "a long blast on the
trumpet" of self-determination. The violence attending secessionist
1. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1993) (quoting
Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points Speech (Jan. 8, 1918), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE 155, 177 (Ray S. Baker & William E. Dodd eds.,
1927)).
2. Joshua 6:5
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self-determination claims often overflows into neighboring countries,
consequently jeopardizing the very "walls" of the nation-state system.3
From the bloodshed of former Yugoslavia, 4 to the successful severing
of Czechoslovakia, 5 from the disaster of Somalia,6 to the gains of
Eritrea,7 and from the breakup of the former Soviet Union,8 to the
demands of Quebec,' the specter of secession haunts the global
scene.' 0 The United States can ill afford to ignore the rampant threat
of secession that imperils global stability and U.S. interests." More-
over, the lack of a clear U.S. policy for responding to the increasing
number of secessionist self-determination claims threatens America's
ability to maintain global order.' 2
Accordingly, with the presence of U.S. forces in Bosnia,"3 the
time to establish clear U.S. guidelines for intervening in secessionist
movements is now. This comment asserts that before the United States
intervenes in the quagmire of a peoples secession, it must follow and
implement three guidelines: first, the United States must ascertain
whether the secessionist claim is legitimate; second, the United States
must intervene only under multilateral auspices that abide by the princi-
ples of humanitarian intervention; and third, if the United States is to
intervene, it must do so with clearly defined objectives. These three
guidelines set practical, minimum standards for measuring the necessity
3. Id. See also Robin Knight et al., Home Sweet Homeland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 26, 1993, at 38-42.
4. See generally MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN TH4E NEW
WORLD ORDER 157 (1992).
5. Holly A. Osterland, National Self-Determination and Secession: The Slovak Model, 25
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 655, 658 (1993).
6. HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 129.
7. Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
479, 481 (1994); Joshua Hammer, Back from the Ruins: Can this be an African Nation that
Works?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 40.
8. HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 148-57.
9. Waving a Magic Wand in Quebec, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 59.
10. Self-determination has two basic categories: secessionist and non-secessionist move-
ments. This comment will solely address the nature of secessionist movements. For a list of the
other forms self-determination may take see Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World
Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1287-88 (1991).
11. Robert Cullen, Collective Rights and Nationalism, CURRENT, June, 1993, at 28; Amitai
Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter, 1992-1993, at 21.
12. HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 123-60 (providing a detailed list of peoples claim-
ing the right to self-determination); Karin von Hippel, The Resurgence of Nationalism and Its
International Implications, WASH. Q., Autumn, 1994, at 185, 191-95 (also providing an infor-
mative list).
13. John Barry & Bob Cohn, Starting the Hard Sell, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 56; see
generally Tom Morgenthau & John Berry, On the March, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at 28;
see also Bill Powell, Dangers Ahead, NEWSWEEK, Dec. I1, 1995, at 34.
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of committing U.S. troops to a peoples secession abroad.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION: FROM PRINCIPLE TO
LEGAL RIGHT
Prior to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 4 the principle of self-determination
had little practical value. 5 In fact, after World War I self-determina-
tion was applied by the victorious Allies as a political tool to redraw
the map of Europe. 6 "Self-determination was considered only for
'nations' which were within the territory of the defeated empires; it
was never thought to apply to overseas colonies."' 7 The seminal
Aland Islands case underscores the low value the nascent League of
Nations attributed to the principle of self-determination. The League
held, under the decision of two panels of jurists, that self-determination
afforded no right of secession and was not an accepted rule of the
"Law of Nations."19
Self-determination evolved towards a legitimate legal right2° when
the United Nations (UN) formally adopted the 1960 Declaration.2'
This evolving right applied, however, only to colonial peoples and did
not include a right to secede.2 The 1960 Declaration holds: "all peo-
ples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development."23 The right to self-determination
solidified further with the passage, in 1970, of the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
14. G.A. Res 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) [hereinafter the 1960 Declaration].
15. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 33-34 (1990). The principle of self-determination is
that "every people should freely determine its own political status" either through "greater
autonomy or local self-government" and this has often led to a people's demand for secession
or "total independence." Id.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. Hannum additionally relates that the league denied the Aland's the right to secede
from Finland, despite the finding that most Alanders would vote to reunite with Sweden. Id. at
10.
20. Hannum, supra note 1, at 12 (stating decolonization of the Third World pushed the
ideal of self-determination from "principle to right").
21. 1960 Declaration, supra note 14.
22. HANNUM, supra note 15, at 46; Mitchell A. Hill, What the Principle of Seif-Deterni-
nation Means Today, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 125 (1995).
23. 1960 Declaration, supra note 14.
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Nations (1970 Declaration). 4 The 1970 Declaration reaffirmed the
right of the "self-determination of peoples" and the continued pursuit
of bringing a "speedy end to colonialism." 5 Hence; a firm, but limit-
ed right to self-determination occurred within the context of anti-colo-
nial sentiments, and self-determination shifted from principle to legal
right.
The importance of the 1970 Declaration is that it has created a
limited right to secede. 6 Paragraph 7 is the key secession component
of the Declaration. 7 Paragraph 7 is composed of three ideas: first, it
upholds the territorial integrity of existing states; 8 second, it "implies
that . . . all states will enjoy this inviolability of their territorial integri-
ty" 9 so long as those states comply with "the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples... "; and third, governments not
representative of the "whole people"'" belonging to the state do not
enjoy the protection of this territorial integrity.32 The 1970 Declara-
tion provides a means for a people to secede if the legitimacy of the
government is not derived from all the segments of the populace.3 If
the government does not represent the "whole people" and creates dis-
tinctions among the people as to "race, creed, or colour", it is violat-
ing the right of self-determination of all peoples; thereby creating the
24. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex 8082, Supp. No.17, at 66, U.N.
Doe. A/5217 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Declaration].
25. Id. 2.
26. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 92 (1978);
Hill supra note 22, at 126; Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds'Right to Secede Under International
Law: Self-Determination Prevails Over Political Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
375, 377 (1994).
27. 1970 Declaration, supra note 24, 1 7 states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed, or colour.
Id. See also BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 92 (stating that paragraph 7 of the 1970 Declaration
recognized "the legitimacy of secession for the first time").
28. 1970 Declaration, supra note 24, 7.
29. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 92. See 1970 Declaration, supra note 24, 7.
30. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 93. See also Hill, supra note 22, at 129; 1970 Declara-
tion, supra note 24, 7.
31. 1970 Declaration, supra note 24, 7.
32. id. See also BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 93; Hill, supra note 22, at 129; Ewald,
supra note 26, at 388; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in
the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1994).
33. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 93; Hill, supra note 22, at 129.
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opportunity for the disenfranchised group to legitimately secede from
the abusive, dominating government.34 Thus, a narrow road to seces-
sion through self-determination does exist for a people where their
government fails to represent the "whole people" or subjugates a seg-
ment of its people.
III. THE STANDARDS AND CRITERIA FOR LEGITIMATE SECESSION
A. The Nature of Secession
The international community views secession as an inherently
dangerous ideal.35 To give life to such an ideal would, in some cases,
be akin to sovereign suicide.36 Therefore, the general rule regarding
secession is that no express right to secede exists under international
law.37 Where there is a rule, however, there is an exception. "Legal
scholars", and institutions, including the UN, have recognized the
applicability of self-determination "outside of the colonial context,
though within rather strict limits." 38 International acceptance of a right
to secede is premised upon the presence of: (1) a collective group, 39
(2) governmental subjugation of that collective group,4 and (3) dis-
ruption to the original state and the international community when that
collective group exercises the right to secede. 4 The United States
should only recognize a secessionist claim as legitimate if it success-
fully meets these three interrelated standards.42
34. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 93; Hill, supra note 22, at 129; Ewald, supra note 26, at
388.
35. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177, 178 (1991) (noting secession requires the re-drawing of existing territo-
rial boundaries); von Hippel, supra note 12, at 189 (stating nations fear legitimizing a right to
secede which may be imposed in their own backyard).
36. von Hippel, supra note 12, at 189.
37. Hill, supra note 22, at 126; Max M. Kampelman, Secession and Self-Determination:
New States and Old Problems, CURRENT, Nov. 1993, at 38.
38. Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention, and Self-Determination, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 55, 64 (1991).
39. Kirgis, supra note 32, at 304, 310; Chen, supra note 10, at 1291; Haile supra note 7,
at 524; Ewald, supra note 26, at 386.
40. Ewald, supra note 26, at 387-88; Haile, supra note 7, at 523; BUCHHEIT, supra note
26, at 218; Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1981).
41. Kirgis, supra note 32, at 310; Chen, supra note 10, at 1291.
42. Kirgis, supra note 32, at 308-10 (stating that a claim to secede is likely to have inter-
national acceptance if it meets these three standards).
1996]
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B. The Collective Group Standard
The first standard for measuring the legitimacy of a secessionist
claim is the presence of a collective group.43 That is, whether a group
perceives itself as a distinct, separate body unto itself, or colloquially,
we are us and they are them. "To qualify as a national group or peo-
ples entitled to secede a claimant must meet both objective and subjec-
tive requirements." '44 The objective and subjective requirements help
to define the vague ideal of what constitutes a people. The objective
requirement is measured by such characteristics as race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, language, history, or cultural heritage.45 Claims to a historical
territory may also suffice to meet the objective component of a collec-
tive group.46 The subjective characteristic relates to the collective
identity of the people as one; or rather, it is a shared sense of a com-
mon destiny with the promise of establishing a separate nation.47 The
subjective requirement measures the extent of the peoples' collective
view of themselves.
Group coherence is also measured by examining the relationship
between the group members and its leaders.48 The leaders should per-
sonify the values and opinions of the group as a whole; if they do not,
the secessionist claim "will fail for lack of a legitimate identifiable
group."4 9 Thus, a collective group must evince objective and subjec-
tive traits that bind it together as a single identity and commit it to the
goal of a separate national status.
C. The Subjugation Standard or the 1970 Declaration Standard
The second standard for measuring the legitimacy of a secessionist
claim is the presence of purposeful governmental subjugation of a
collective group. This standard is derived from the 1970 Declara-
tion.5  The 1970 Declaration implies that when a government is not
representative of the "whole people" and bases distinctions "as to race,
creed, or colour,"'" a legitimate right to secede may exist.52 This
43. Ewald, supra note 26, at 385.
44. Haile, supra note 7, at 524.
45. Id. See Ewald, supra note 26, at 386.
46. Brilmayer, supra note 35, at 179 (arguing that a territorial claim is generally implicit
in any secessionist movement); Ewald, supra note 26, at 386.
47. Haile, supra note 7, at 524; Ewald, supra note 26, at 386.
48. Ewald, supra note 26, at 386 (stating leaders should represent the people as a whole).
49. Id.
50. 1970 Declaration, supra note 24. In particular, see id. 7.
51. Id.
52. Nanda, supra note 40, at 269-70; Hill, supra note 22, at 126-29; Ewald, supra note
26, at 377-78; Kirgis, supra note 32, at 306; BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 93. These all state
that in extreme cases of subjugation a people may legitimately secede.
[Vol. 3:313
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right to secede is derived from the notion of a colonial people to estab-
lish a separate identity free of government subjugation. 3 An unrepre-
sentative or abusive government that purposely discriminates or vio-
lates human rights imbues the collective group with a legitimate right
to secede. The purposeful subjugating of a people is held to occur
within the context of racist regimes (i.e. the former apartheid system of
South Africa)," "repressive dictatorships"," and governmental viola-
tion of fundamental human rights.6
D. The Disruption Standard
The final standard for measuring a legitimate secession is to weigh
the degree to which it disrupts the status quo. Secession is, however,
inherently disruptive because it reconfigures the existing boundaries
and populace of the original state. 7 Nonetheless, the disruption stan-
dard is a balancing test weighing the benefits and burdens of a right to
secede.5" On one side of the scale is secession, on the other is "the ef-
fects of separation on the remaining state . . . , and the effects on
general international order."59 The initial effect on the original state is
its loss of territory and populace to the seceding state.'
In determining the effect of this loss one must inquire into factors such as the
economic significance of the seceding province to its former partners, and
the strategic value of the territory and population. The amount of disruption
will obviously be high if the secession threatens to remove the economic base
of the country (as in the secession of the Katanga); expose the remaining
state to aggression from a hostile neighbor; split the state in two geographi-
cally by the creation of a new entity between remaining regions; jeopardize
access to ports or facilities for external trade and communication, and so
on.
61
These potential losses are, however, acceptable if secession promotes
regional and international amity; or if it engenders great economic
gains for the seceding state.62 Naturally, the presence of great burdens
53. Nanda, supra note 40, at 269-70; see 1960 Declaration, supra note 14.
54. Haile, supra note 7, at 516.
55. Kirgis, supra note 32, at 308.
56. Id.; Ewald, supra note 26, at 378; Hill, supra note 22, at 129.
57. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 231-32; Brilmayer, supra note 35, at 178.
58. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 232.
59. Id.; see Chen, supra note 10, at 1291 (noting effects of secession should be viewed "in
terms of regional and international peace"); see Kirgis, supra note 32, at 308 (noting that the
more democratic a state is the more it lessens the legitimacy of the claim; and conversely, the
more repressive a state is the more it increases the legitimacy of the claim).
60. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 232.
61. Id.; see Etzioni, supra note 11, at 29-34 (providing an interesting discussion of the
economic harms associated with secession).
62. Chen, supra note 10, at 1291-92.
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upon the original state correspondingly weakens the secessionist claim,
and tips the scale in favor of a continued single entity.
The effect of secession on global order is an issue given great
weight as well.63 Related to global order is the need for seceding
states to be economically self-sufficient.' If a seceding state is unable
to provide for itself, it may become a needy and burdensome ward of
the international community.6" Other legitimate international concerns
are, to name a few, the impact on "trapped minorities" within the
seceding state,' and the violence often associated with secessionist
movements.67 The presence or likely presence of such factors will
cause the international community to view with disfavor any attempt at
secession. Understandably, the balance is tipped in favor of maintain-
ing the status quo. Thus, the burden of proving insignificant disruptive
effects to the present state and the international community rest upon
the people claiming the right to secede.
IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: STANDARDS AND CRITERIA
A. The Doctrine of Non-Intervention and the Humanitarian
Intervention Exception
In both the nineteenth and twentieth century there are many exam-
ples of states intervening in other states' territory for humanitarian
reasons.68 Interventions for humanitarian reasons are, however, the
exception; and the normal rule is that a state generally cannot infringe
upon another state's territorial integrity.69 The integrity of a state's
territory is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.7"
63. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 232.
64. Id.; see Etzioni, supra note 11, at 29-34 (arguing persuasively that secession unduly
disrupts the economy of the original state and the seceding state).
65. BUCHHEIT, supra note 26, at 232.
66. Id.
67. Knight, supra note 3, at 38-42.
68. James A.R. Naffiger, Self Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Commu-
nity of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 21 (1991) (relating that Russia, India,
France, and the United States have used humanitarian reasons in the past to intervene in anoth-
er state's affairs).
69. Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 570 (1994); see also Nafziger, supra note 68, at 22.
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. It states: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
Article 2, paragraph 7, also limits the U.N.'s ability to intervene in domestic affairs of state. It
states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
[Vol. 3:313
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Article 2(4) provides that nations must refrain "in their international
relations from the threat of the use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state."'" Hence, the general
rule of non-intervention takes precedence over the use of force by one
state in the affairs of another.
Nevertheless, international law expressly recognizes two excep-
tions to the rule of non-intervention: (1) state intervention as an act of
self-defense or request for assistance in the self defense of another
state, and (2) state intervention to maintain global peace and securi-
ty.7" It is argued that states may act to defend themselves or to assist
the defenseless from human rights violations by acting under the self-
defense provisions of Article 51." There is, however, no international
acceptance of this view.74
A more forceful argument for allowing humanitarian intervention
is the respect granted by the UN Charter to the furtherance of human
rights and basic freedoms.75 That is, human rights are equal to, if not
higher than, the principle of non-intervention established in the UN
Charter.76 Humanitarian intervention is deemed lawful when it is used
to alleviate a grave threat or actual harm to human rights.77 There-
ment under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id. art. 2, 7.
71. Id. art. 2, 4.
72. David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 210 (1994) (explaining these two exceptions
are derived from Article 51); U.N. CHARTER art. 51. In full, Article 51 states:
Nothing in the Present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the resources necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42, & 48 (describing how the Security Council may
act to restore peace in the face of State aggression).
73. Nafziger, supra note 68, at 24; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
74. Nafziger, supra note 68, at 24.
75. Ryan, supra note 38, at 58.
Articles I and 55 of the Charter commit the United Nations to promotion of uni-
versal respect for human rights and basic freedoms, and Article 56 gives member
nations and obligation to act, jointly or separately, to achieve the purposes set out




77. Captain Benjamin P. Dean, Self-Determination and U.S. Support of Insurgents: A
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fore, most nations and many scholars also recognize humanitarian
intervention as an exception to the non-intervention rule.7" Internation-
al acceptance of humanitarian intervention is premised upon systematic
and persistent human rights violations that imperil international order
and security;' and this humanitarian intervention is further accepted
when founded under multilateral auspices.8" The United States should
undertake humanitarian intervention only when these two standards are
met.
B. The Standards For Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention is acceptable when human rights viola-
tions pose a threat to global order and security.8' By threatening glob-
al order and security the human rights abuses become international
concerns.82 Human rights violations that are systematic and persistent
may trigger a larger international jurisdiction that supersedes a state's
singular control of domestic matters.83 This international jurisdiction
is limited to the problem affecting global order and security; it does not
extend to any other state functions.84 Humanitarian intervention may
occur only when a state violates human rights on a systematic and
persistent basis.85 "Violations of rights are systematic if they are part
of a 'consistent pattern', or are a matter of 'state policy."' 86 The state
policy can be either overt practices or covert practices, which insti-
tutionalize the state's denial of human rights to a group of people.87
"Violations of rights are persistent when they are more than occasional
or of short duration[;]" 88 that is, they occur repeatedly over and over
Policy-Analysis Model, 122 MIL. L. REV. 148, 182 (1988). Captain Dean further states that
U.S. troops should be proportional to the mission, should not remain long, and should be used
after other alternatives are exhausted. Id.
78. Ryan, supra note 38, at 56.
79. Id. at 59-60.
80. See Kresock, supra note 72, at 214 (further pointing out that many commentators feel
humanitarian intervention does not violate state "sovereignty" or "territorial integrity" because
"territorial conquest" is not the aim of the humanitarily intervening party); Gordon, supra note
69, at 524; Nafziger, supra note 68, at 31.
81. Gordon, supra note 69, at 524; Nafziger, supra note 68, at 25-26 (listing a host of
criteria that would ideally "define the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention").
82. Gordon, supra note 69, at 524-25.
83. Id.; see Ryan, supra note 38, at 59-61.
84. Gordon, supra note 69, at 524-25.
85. Ryan, supra note 38, at 61.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. "Admittedly, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine how long a practice must
endure to be persistent. ... Id. Factors to consider are: whether the persecution was the
stated policy of the state; whether the persecution was exported to other countries; and whether
the persecution was aided by governmental activities. Id.
[Vol. 3:313
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during a period of time. 9 Therefore, the systematic and persistent
violations of human rights over an extended period of time can trigger
outside humanitarian intervention.
Furthermore, a second component adding legitimacy to humanitari-
an intervention is multilateral action.9" Multilateral intervention is
deemed superior to unilateral intervention because it provides a "more
reliable consensus of support, checks abuses, and better ensures that
intervention is warranted."' It also tends to evince more clarity of
purpose, since state actors forming the multilateral force must agree, in
principle, on the purposes of the intervention.92 Moreover, a problem
such as severe human rights violations in a region located far from
America is insoluble without the support of other nations.93 A multi-
lateral approach can occur under UN auspices or other international
and regional organs,94 thereby adding the moral force of those organi-
zations to the humanitarian intervention. Hence, before intervening in a
secessionist claim, the United States must determine whether human
rights violations are occurring on a systematic and persistent basis that,
in turn, imperil international order and security. Additionally, the U.S.
role in the intervention should be founded under multilateral auspices.
V. SECESSION AND CLEAR OBJECTIVES
Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect values
we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also want
their foreign policy to be effective.
-Former Secretary of State George Shultz
89. Id.
90. Gordon, supra note 69, at 521; see also id. at 521 n.6. "Unilateral interventions are
generally to achieve the national interests of the intervenor. Multilateral interventions ... have
sought to maintain international peace and security, maintain national sovereignty and inde-
pendence, advance self-determination, promote and protect fundamental human rights, alleviate
massive suffering and advance the economic and social development of developing countries."
Id.; see also Naffiger, supra note 68, at 26.
91. Nafziger, supra note 68, at 26 (further stating that U.S. leadership in collective ac-
tions, such as in the Gulf War and the subsequent Kurd problem in northern Iraq, has proven
the successful applicability of multilateralism).
92. Id.
93. Paul H. Nitze, Foreword: International Security in a New World, 81 GEO. L.J. 481,
486 (1993).
94. Nafziger, supra note 68, at 33 (listing the Organization of American States, the Group
of Seven, and the European Community as examples); see also id. at 31. Other examples are
NATO, which is leading the way for peace in Bosnia, and SEATO.
95. George Schultz, Power and Diplomacy in the 1980's, Address Before the Trilateral
Commission (Apr. 3, 1984).in DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1984, at 12-I5.
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A. U. S. Objectives
U.S. policy objectives provide clarity of purpose and aid the deci-
sion of whether U.S. troops should go abroad." The use of military
force should not occur "without a clear and precise mission, solid
public backing, and enough resources to finish the job."97 Hence,
before committing U.S. troops to a violent or possibly violent seces-
sionist movement, the United States must establish clear objectives for
the use of force in such a situation.98 Clearly, uniform objectives can-
not be tailor-made for each possible secession. Regardless, broad
guidelines do provide a basis for a working litmus test and can provide
adaptable means to fit particular situations. Well defined objectives also
serve to promote the needed support of the American public, which is
essential to success.99 Finally, well-defined objectives can be weighed
against the danger of committing U.S. forces; and naturally, if the
danger outweighs the benefits or realistic limits of the objectives, U.S.
forces should not be sent."°
B. Objectives: The Criteria on the Use of United States Military Force
Any policy-making process for sending U.S. troops to any place of
danger, especially violent secessionist movements, must determine the
scope of the objectives and goals for placing American military forces
in harm's way."' To weigh the benefits and burdens of committing
U.S. troops to a secession effort, whether the goal is to prop up the
movement or to keep the peace, U.S. policy makers should consider
the following specific criteria:
1) whether the threat to the vital interests of the United States or its
allies is serious enough to warrant military action;'°:
2) whether sufficient support (number of troops, finances, logistics) can
be given to ensure a successful outcome or rather, a commitment to suc-
ceed;,03
96. Caspar W. Weinberger, National Press Club (Nov. 28, 1984), reprinted in The Uses of
Military Power, DEFENSE, Jan. 1985, at 2 [hereinafter Weinberger National Press Club
Speech]. Caspar Weinberger served as Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration.
See also Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 683 (1986) [herein-
after Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy].
97. George Shultz, Address at the 1984 Conference of the Trilateral Commission, quoted
in Dean, supra note 77, at 212.
98. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 2.
99. Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy, supra note 96, at 685.
100. Id. at 685-86.
101. Dean, supra note 77, at 215.
102. Adopted and adapted from Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at
10, and from Dean, supra note 77, at 215.
103. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 10; see also Dean, supra
note 77, at 215.
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3) "[w]hether American armed forces are likely to become drawn into a
protracted combat role;""
4) whether there is "some reasonable assurance" of the support of the
American people; iu
5) whether there is a commitment to constantly reassess and adjust the
use of U.S. forces as necessary;l and
6) whether diplomatic, political, and economic measures have been
exhausted i.e., "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last
resort. "107
Before committing U.S. forces to a people's secessionist movement
most, if not all, of these six criteria should be met.t"' Employing
such criteria engenders meaningful policy making and provides a good
starting point for weighing the necessity of endangering American
lives." 9 Most important of all, clear objectives educate the American
citizenry, and for success to occur their support is a necessity."'
VI. SECESSION: THE BOSNIAN CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE AND U.S.
POLICY UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.
A. Background on Bosnia
In October, 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) declared its inde-
pendence from Yugoslavia."' However, Serbs living in Bosnia con-
tested the legality of the secession from Yugoslavia."' To quell the
claims of the minority Serbs and to prove the legitimacy of their inde-
pendence, the Bosnian parliament voted to hold a national referen-
dum. '3 The subsequent referendum for independence was approved
by "nearly sixty-three percent of the Bosnian voters..". Serb minori-
ties declined, however, to participate in the referendum and rebelled
against Bosnian independence. "5 Hence, the crux of the problem in
Bosnia is its diverse ethnic population where a substantial Serb minori-
ty refused to accept Bosnian independence from a Serb dominated
Yugoslavia." 6 In fact, the Serb minority has claimed its own right to
104. Dean, supra note 77, at 215.
105. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 10.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 9; Dean, supra note 77, at 215.
109. Dean, supra note 77, at 215.
110. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 5 (noting America's domes-
tic turmoil and lack of support for the Vietnam War, which ultimately ended in American de-
feat).
111. Hill, supra note 22, at 130.
112. Id.
113. Kresock, supra note 72, at 221.
114. Id.
115. Hill, supra note 22, at 130.
116. William A. Schroeder, Nationalism, Boundaries, and the Bosnian War: Another Per-
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secede and unite with the Serb majority of former Yugoslavia." 7 Al-
though the United States and the international community in mid-1992
have recognized Bosnia's claim to secede," 8 neither the United States
nor the international community have recognized a Bosnian Serb right
to secede and reunite with Yugoslavia, now Serbia-Montenegro." 9
Shortly thereafter, full scale war broke out with the Bosnian Serb
minorities supported by the Serb dominated Yugoslavian army.2
B. Bosnia and the Clinton Administration
The Clinton Administration has been decidedly confused on the
Bosnian problem. The administration has vacillated from not involving
U.S. forces, 2' to air dropping humanitarian supplies;'22 from no di-
rect use of U.S. force in Bosnia,'23 to waging a bombing campaign
on Serb forces;' 24 and from not placing U.S. troops on the ground in
Bosnia,'25 to committing 20,000 plus American soldiers in Bosnia un-
der NATO auspices.'26 The Clinton policy is a gradualist approach to
resolving the Bosnian problem. What remains unclear is whether the
Clinton Administration will devise clear objectives for placing Ameri-
can soldiers in a hostile and dangerous locale. 27  An even more
daunting task for President Clinton is whether he can obtain the sup-
port of the American public for maintaining the presence of U.S. forc-
es in a hostile and seemingly intractable Balkan environment.'28
spective, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 153, 154 (1994) (further stating that "in the early 1990's Bosnia's
population was 44% [to] 49% Muslims, 31% [to] 35% Serbs and about 17% Croats").
117. Id. at 155.
118. Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law After the
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 327-28
(1993). During the Bush Administration the United States recognized Bosnian independence on
April 7, 1992. Id.
119. Schroeder, supra note 116, at 155.
120. Id.
121. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56.
122. Kresock, supra note 72, at 231.
123. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56.
124. President Bill Clinton, Why Bosnia Matters to America, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at
55.
125. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56.
126. Id.; see also Joe Klein, A Grip-But No Gains, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 52.
127. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55. President Clinton promises that U.S troops "will have
clear rules of engagement, a carefully defined mission, and an exit strategy." 1d. It remains to
be seen whether his promises will be kept.
128. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56. As of late October, 1995, a Newsweek poll found
that 27% of Americans support sending U.S. troops to the Balkans, while 59% oppose it. Id.
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VII. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS AND CRITERIA
FOR UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT - A BOSNIA CASE EXAMPLE
A. U.S. Guideline Number One: The Standards and Criteria for
Legitimate Secession in Bosnia
1. The Collective Group Standard
The first standard the United States should apply to measure the
validity of Bosnia's claim to secede is the collective group standard.
The people of Bosnia arguably do not meet the collective group stan-
dard. In general, Bosnia meets the objective requirements of a collec-
tive group because the majority of the people share a common Slavic
ethnicity, language, and cultural heritage. 9 On the other hand, the
ethnicity of Bosnia is further delineated into three ethnic groups: Mus-
lim, Serb, and Croat. 3 ' Thus, Bosnia is not a culturally or ethnically
distinct nation but rather a conglomerated group of three separate
ethnic identities. The people of Bosnia also do not share a common
religion, which has led in part to the intensity of the fighting among
Bosnians. The Bosnian Muslims are Islamic; while the Serbs are pri-
marily Eastern Orthodox Christians; and the Croats are primarily Ro-
man Catholics.' 3 ' Thus, the diverse ethnic people of Bosnia do not
meet the objective requirements of the collective group standard.
Moreover, if the people of Bosnia do not meet the objective re-
quirements, they certainly do not meet the subjective requirement of a
collective group. Although each of the three groups share a collective
identity as a distinct people, the people of Bosnia as a whole do not
share a collective identity.'32 Hence, under the collective group stan-
dard the United States should not have so readily recognized Bosnia's
claim to secede from Yugoslavia. To demonstrate the application of
Bosnia to the rest of the proposed guidelines this comment will assume
that the people of Bosnia are a collective group.
2. The 1970 Declaration Standard or the Subjugation Standard
The second standard the United States should use to determine the
validity of Bosnia's claim to secede is the 1970 Declaration Standard.
Assuming the people of Bosnia meet the collective group standard,
their right to secede under the 1970 Declaration is strong. Prior to
129. Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of
Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REV.
214, 231-34 (1992) (stating Bosnians are Slavs; its language is Serbo-Croatian; and its history
traces back to the ninth century).
130. Schroeder, supra note 116, at 154.
131. Iglar, supra note 129, at 232-33.
132. Id. at 230-35 (discussing the broad commonalties and specific differences of the Mus-
lim Slavs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes). See Schroeder, supra note 116, at 153-54.
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secession, Bosnia was part of a federated Yugoslavia dominated by
Serbs.'33 Moreover, since the outbreak of war in 1992, there is ample
evidence of Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.'34 The Serbs use of eth-
nic cleansing against the Croat and Muslim Bosnians is a blatant at-
tempt to subjugate a people in the most heinous fashion-genocide. The
widespread use of ethnic cleansing is certainly a violation of fundamen-
tal human rights. Undoubtedly, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims have
been imbued with the right to secede.
3. The "Disruption" Standard
Bosnia arguably satisfies the disruption standard as well. Although
the secession of Bosnia had considerable disruptive effects to the state
of Yugoslavia, those effects occurred in conjunction with the secessions
of Croatia and Slovenia. 3 ' Additionally, Bosnia is not the economic
base of Yugoslavia; nor has it exposed the remaining state to a hostile
neighbor. 136
Moreover, Bosnia is, though neither rich nor poor, capable of
sustaining itself economically without undue charitable aid from the
international community. The disruptive effects to global order are,
however, quite considerable. Violence in Bosnia is significant and the
presence of ethnic cleansing has not contributed to global order.'3 '
There is also a substantial number of trapped Serb minorities within
Bosnia. On the other hand, the cause of the violence is largely attribut-
ed to the Serbs and no one could have anticipated the horror and wide-
spread practice of Serb ethnic cleansing. The extreme violation of
Bosnian human rights at the hands of Serbs is compelling evidence that
continued Serb rule of Bosnia would not have been peaceful, further
disrupting global order. In such a case, the balancing test of the disrup-
tion standard may likely tip toward the right of Bosnia to legitimately
secede.
133. Philip J. Cohen, M.D., Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia, 6
PACE INT'L L. REV. 19, 19 (1994).
134. Kresock, supra note 72, at 221-25 (listing several official and unofficial reports of
Serbian-led systematic killings of Bosnian Muslims, which has been applied to the Croats as
well).
135. Eastwood, supra note 118, at 325.
136. Iglar, supra note 129, at 223. Though Bosnia is not the economic base of the former
Yugoslavia, both Slovenia and Croatia constitute such a base. "Slovenia is Yugoslavia's most
prosperous and most industrialized republic. Croatia is its second most wealthy republic.
Combined, the two republics produce approximately 50 percent of Yugoslavia's total exports
and they enjoy the highest standards of living in Yugoslavia." Id. See also Kresock, supra
note 72, at 221 (noting that Bosnia's desire to secede was peaceful and did not become violent
until Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslavian federal goevernment, attempted to repudiate
Bosnian independence).
137. Kresock, supra note 72, at 223.
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B. U.S. Guideline Number Two: The Standards and Criteria For U.S.
Humanitarian Intervention in Bosnia
1. Systematic and Persistent Human Rights Violations
For the United States to justifiably intervene in Bosnia, it must
show systematic and persistent violations of human rights. When hu-
man rights abuses disrupt international order and are present on a
systematic and persistent basis, a larger international jurisdiction takes
precedence over the traditional right of domestic state control. 3 ' In
Bosnia, the practice of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs is disrupting
international order and is undoubtedly systematic and persistent. It is
estimated that by the end of 1992 "Serb forces had killed as many as
200,000 Bosnian Muslims"; "held up to 75,000 Bosnians in concentra-
tion camps"; and "raped as many as 50,000 Bosnian Muslim wom-
en."'' 39 Ethnic cleansing by the Serbs is regarded as an attempt to
create a "Greater Serbia" and has been carried out since June,
1992.14 Hence, the Serbs' use of ethnic cleansing is an international-
izing event that provides the United States and other third party states a
right to intervene in Bosnia to instill order.'4
2. Multilateral Action
Humanitarian intervention under multilateral auspices also adds
legitimacy to the U.S. efforts to secure peace in the Balkans. Because
the human rights violations are occurring in central Europe, it is neces-
sary for the United States to have support from other nations, especial-
ly the nations of Europe. 42 The current involvement of Germany,
Great Britain, France, Russia, and the European Union in general
demonstrates a "reliable consensus of support" for resolving the
Bosnian problem. 43
Presently, the United States is intervening in Bosnia under NATO
auspices. ' By so doing, the United States is demonstrating its com-
mitment to peace in a war torn region through the teamwork of other
nations also committed to ensuring global order. Such a multilateral ef-
fort led by the United States evinces altruistic ideals while protecting
the broader U.S. interests of a strong unified Europe and global order.
A U.S. multilateral effort to alleviate human suffering further demon-
strates that America does not have territorial designs in the world
138. Gordon, supra note 69, at 524.
139. Kresock, supra note 72, at 223-25.
140. Id. at 223.
141. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
142. Nitze, supra note 93, at 486.
143. Nafziger, supra note 68, at 26.
144. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56; Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
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arena. Hence, the current Clinton plan for intervening in Bosnia under
NATO auspices is certainly a justified, lawful exercise of humanitarian
intervention. The multilateral effort also serves to legitimize the hu-
manitarian intervention and increase worldwide support.
C. U. S. Guideline Number Three: U. S. Objectives for Intervention In
Bosnia
As President Clinton continues to convince the American public of
the need for U.S. forces in Bosnia, both he and the American people
should seek clear objectives for doing so. Clear objectives provide the
Clinton Administration and the American people with a working litmus
test for measuring the necessity of committing and maintaining U.S.
troops abroad.'45
1. Vital U.S. Interests
Arguably, vital U.S. interests and those of our allies are at stake in
Bosnia. "Peace in Bosnia matters" to America because "[w]e have an
urgent stake in stopping the slaughter, preventing the war from spread-
ing, and building a Europe at peace.""' A war raging in the heart-
land of Europe threatens European interests; and thus threatens U.S
interests.'47 "A united[, peaceful] Europe will be America's best
partner in security and trade." 4' Nevertheless, are the vital interests
of the United States and its allies threatened enough to warrant military
action? And is it necessary to risk the lives of U.S. troops to maintain
peace in Bosnia? The Bosnian War has raged for more than three years
and it has not spread outside the realm of former Yugoslavia.' 49
Moreover, why should the United States risk the lives of its citizens,
when the nations of Europe will not authoritatively act to solve a prob-
lem occurring in their own heartland?5 '
Despite these shortcomings, the United States does have legitimate
interests at stake both in Europe and the world.' 5' Winning the peace
145. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07 for a list of the necessary objectives.
146. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
147. Cohen, supra note 133, at 20 (stating that if Serbia "is not stopped in Bosnia, the
aggression predictably will extend to Kosovo and Macedonia, where ominous signs point to the
possibility of wider regional conflict").
148. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
149. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56.
150. This comment does not mean to malign the gritty efforts of the U.N. peacekeepers in
the former Yugoslavia, many of which are composed of European military forces, but only to
show that united European action to end the fighting in Bosnia has not occurred.
151. Maja Popovic, Yugoslavia: A Case Study of International Consequences of Indepen-
dence, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 205, 208-12 (1993) (arguing that the war could spread
beyond former Yugoslavia); Paul D. Wolfowitz, Clinton's First Year, FOREIGN AFF., Winter,
1994, at 33 (stating that vital U.S. interests implicated in the Bosnian War are to maintain
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in Bosnia directly effects U.S. interests, and our unique qualifica-
tion ' to resolve the Bosnian ordeal makes a compelling case for a
leading U.S. role. Under this criterion for deploying U.S. troops to
Bosnia, the answer is likely - yes.
2. A Commitment to Succeed
The present U.S. intervention in Bosnia must occur with a clear
commitment to win a lasting peace in Bosnia. The proper number of
troops with the proper amount of force should be applied to ensure that
hostilities will not resume as soon as U.S. forces have left the field. "If
we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary" to win a
lasting peace, "we should not commit them at all."' 53
President Clinton has insisted that the current deployment of U.S.
troops to Bosnia is based on "the parties [the Serbs, Croats and Mus-
lims] committment to a solid peace agreement." 54 Despite this insis-
tence, it is doubtful that the Serbs, Croats, or Muslims will entirely
commit to a lasting peace. 5  Thus, deploying U.S. forces in harm's
way as a temporary stop gap measure is not a commitment to win a
lasting peace.' 56 Under this criterion for deploying U.S. troops to
Bosnia, the answer is a resounding - no.
3. The Risk of a Protracted U.S. Role
The Clinton Administration must weigh the risks of involving U.S.
troops in a protracted military quagmire. At the present time, the three
ethnic groups involved in the fighting are militarily exhausted and stand
to gain more from a peace settlement than continued strife.'57 The
Clinton Administration feels that the Serbs will not pose a serious
challenge while U.S. troops are present.' Despite these educated
guesses, it is uncertain whether U.S. troops could potentially be drawn
into a wider conflict.' 59 Under this criterion for deploying U.S.
"NATO confidence"; to minimize damage to relations between "the West and the Muslim
world"; and to lessen the "pronuclear sentiments in Ukraine").
152. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States is the sole remaining global
superpower.
153. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 10.
154. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
155. Klein, supra note 126, at 53 (stating that the Croats will likely seek to "carve up
Bosnia when the Americans leave;" and the Serbs will likely resume hostilities as well).
156. Wolfowitz, supra note 151, at 4 (arguing that U.S intervention in Bosnia presents the
"very great likelihood of a forced military retreat").
157. Klein, supra note 126, at 52.
158. id. at 53 (stating that it was likely that the Serbs would go underground once U.S.
troops arrived; and that any serious resistance to U.S. troops would melt away as it did in
Haiti after U.S. Marines gunned down ten Haitian policemen).
159. Popovic, supra note 151, at 207 (noting that Serbs comprised a large bulk of the armed
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troops to Bosnia, the answer is a tentative - maybe.
4. The Support of the American People
The current United States intervention in Bosnia must have, to
ensure success, the support of the American public and their represen-
tatives. To commit U.S. troops without the support of the public sows
discord in the nation and lessens the chances for a successful out-
come."w At the present time, the Clinton Administration does not
have the support of the American people for its use of U.S. troops in
Bosnia. 6 ' In fact, the majority of Americans oppose the presence of
U.S. troops in Bosnia."5 2 Lack of public support is subject to change,
provided the Clinton Administration can rally the American people and
present a clear case for why America should maintain its presence in
Bosnia. Moreover, President Clinton must continue to convince a wary
Congress of the need for U.S. troops in Bosnia.'63 Under this criteri-
on for deploying U.S. troops to Bosnia, the answer is clearly and
presently - no.
5. A Commitment to Adapt to the Situation
The Clinton Administration must also be committed to constantly
reassessing and adjusting the use of American forces present in Bosnia.
The President must be willing to adjust the number of troops in Bosnia;
adjust the "rules of engagement"; adjust the parameters of the "mis-
sion"; and adjust the "exit strategy"."' 4 Indeed, the Clinton Adminis-
tration must be prepared to lengthen the time frame U.S. troops may
need to win a lasting peace beyond the currently planned one year
stay.'65 In light of President Clinton's pledge to do his utmost to
"protect our troops and ensure the effectiveness of the operation,""
forces of former Yugoslavia and that former Yugoslavia was "itself a modem authoritarian,
garrison state having the fifth-largest army in Europe"). See also Michael Hirsh, Back to the
Woodshed, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 36 (relating the threat posed by the presence of
Iranian terrorists working with Bosnian Muslims).
160. Weinberger National Press Club Speech, supra note 96, at 5.
161. Barry & Cohn, supra note 13, at 56. As of October, 1995 a Newsweek poll found that
only 27% of Americans favored sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. Id.
162. Id. Fifty-nine percent of Americans oppose sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. Id.
163. Kevin Fedarko, Getting Down to Business, TIME, Nov. 13, 1995, at 75 (stating the
House of Representatives "passed a nonbinding resolution prohibiting Clinton from even pledg-
ing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia without congressional consent").
164. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55 (quoting the terms the President has initially set for
U.S. troop involvement in Bosnia).
165. Klein, supra note 126, at 53. The administration is optimistic that GIs can be inserted
with relatively low risk-and pulled out, triumphant, a year later just in time for the elections.
Id.
166. Clinton, supra note 124, at 55.
[Vol. 3:313
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
it would seem he is committed to adjusting to the situation. The
President's one year time table for U.S. troop withdrawal is, however,
problematic. Under this criterion for deploying U.S. troops to Bosnia,
the answer is a tentative - maybe.
6. U.S. Force as a Last Resort
The current U.S. intervention in Bosnia must occur only after
reasonable diplomatic, political, and economic measures have been
exhausted. Arguably, the Clinton Administration has done little diplo-
matically or politically to defuse the Bosnian problem. 167 On the other
hand, the U.S. sponsored peace meeting in Dayton has engendered




Economic pressure has also been applied. Indeed, the United States and
the United Nations (UN) have imposed economic sanctions against
Serbia-Montenegro (Serbia) since the advent of hostilities. 69 The ef-
fectiveness of the economic sanctions on Serbia is, however, question-
able. '7 The sanctions have also caused harm to Bosnia, the country
the sanctions sought to help.' 7 ' The United States and the UN have
applied reasonable diplomatic, political, and economic pressure that
momentarily have resulted in a tentative cease fire among the warring
parties. Nevertheless, the peace will not last without significant outside
military intervention. President Clinton recognizes the tentativeness of
the cease-fire and feels that the presence of U.S. troops in Bosnia will
solidify a more lasting peace. Under this criterion for deploying U.S.
troops to Bosnia, the answer is a simple - yes.
Although the Clinton Administration has articulated why American
interests are at stake in Bosnia, it has not clearly articulated to the
American people or their representatives why U.S. troops are neces-
sary to win the peace in Bosnia. Moreover, the Clinton Administration
has not carefully scrutinized the potential for a protracted U.S. role in
Bosnia; nor has it realistically weighed the necessity to adapt to chang-
ing circumstances in Bosnia. Hence, at the present time the Clinton
Administration has failed to articulate clear and convincing policy
167. Wolfowitz, supra note 151, at 4 (stating that "treating the Bosnian government like a
real government-including opening an embassy in Sarajevo" would have provided more con-
crete diplomatic and political recognition of Bosnia).
168. Fedarko, supra note 163, at 74-75; see also Klein, supra note 126, at 52-53.
169. M. Jennifer Mackay, Economic Sanctions: Are They Actually Enforcing International
Law in Serbia-Montenegro?, 3 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 222-23 (1995).
170. Id. at 227 (arguing that the sanctions seem to have strengthened Serbia's belief that it
is "surrounded by enemies"; moreover, most Serbs "blame the West for their country's pre-
dicament instead of the government and its economic policies").
171. Id. at 223-24; see also Wolfowitz, supra note 151, at 4 (stating that the arms sanctions
imposed against both Serbia and Bosnia aided Serbia at the expense of Bosnia).
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objectives for intervening in Bosnia.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Within the context of Bosnia's secession, it is clear that the people
of Bosnia do not meet the collective group standard. They do meet,
however, the 1970 Declaration standard and, arguably, the disruption
standard. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of secession is measured by these
three interrelated standards. The failure of the Bosnian people to meet
the collective group standard is directly averse to committing U.S.
troops to bolster Bosnia's secession. However, in light of the practice
of ethnic cleansing, the moral imperative for U.S. humanitarian inter-
vention in Bosnia is strong. The overall policy objectives for determin-
ing whether the United States should humanitarily intervene in Bosnia
are not entirely clear either. It is important to note, however, that only
two of the six criteria (vital interests and force as a last resort) possibly
affirm U.S. intervention in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration obvi-
ously carries the burden of persuading the American people of the need
for endangering U.S. troops in Bosnia. Accordingly, U.S. forces
should not have been deployed to intervene in Bosnia.
There is no bright line rule for determining whether U.S. forces
should presently be in Bosnia. In fact, there is no bright line rule for
determining when to commit U.S. forces at all. As is apparent, the
three guidelines established in this comment provide conflicting an-
swers to the Bosnian problem. The purpose of such guidelines is not
just to provide answers, but to engender debate within our government
and among our people. There will always be people who agree or
disagree with the answers. More important is the need to ask the hard
questions; or rather, do the means justify the ends.
Stephan A. Wangsgard
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